Constitutional Law--Commerce Clause--Municipal Occupational Privilege Taxes--Photographers by Doyle, Charles Richard
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 43 | Issue 2 Article 6
1954
Constitutional Law--Commerce Clause--




Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the
Taxation-State and Local Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Doyle, Charles Richard (1954) "Constitutional Law--Commerce Clause--Municipal Occupational Privilege Taxes--Photographers,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 43 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol43/iss2/6
IENTucK LAw JouRNAL
In summary, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals should not
lose another good opportunity to clarify the Kentucky view as to the
alienability of both the possibility of reverter and the power of term-
ination, and to do what was not done in the Austin case: explain




Occupational privilege taxes by municipalities, involved in suits
concerning the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution, have
traditionally been categorized into two classes-peddlers' taxes, and
solicitors' taxes. Generally speaking, such taxes on peddlers have been
ruled constitutionally valid, while similar taxes or regulations on
solicitors have been held to violate the Commerce Clause.1 This note
presents a problem of taxation and regulation in an area which is
thought to be between the two categories. Especially noted herein
will be the current attempts, failures, and successes of municipal
privilege taxes on photographers. In general, it can be stated that the
problem settles to a conflict between the police power and the taxing
power of the states,2 and the power of the Federal government to
regulate commerce.
"'The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States .... ;
'The contended need for taxation and regulation of either the peddlers or
the solicitors is based upon several complaints-they create outside competition;
they are pestiferous nuisances; they may be dishonest; they are ofttimes financially
irresponsible; their trades present many and varied opportunities for fraud and
crimes collateral to their admittance into private homes; and local government is
unable to collect from these classes revenues under the usual general tax laws.
See HARTMAN, STATE TAxATiON OF INTERSTATE COM2vECE 111 (1953); 40 Am.
Jun. 921 (1942). The tax power and the reserved police ower of the states-to
further the public health, morals, and sifety; to prevent gaud, deceit, and dis-
honest dealing generally-are bases for imposing some regulation and taxation
where the laws are reasonably designed to accomplish these objects. See Breard
v. Alexandria, 841 U.S. 622, 640 (1951); State v. Mobley, 234 N.C. 55, 66 S.E.
2d 12, 19 (1951). Allied with the police power basis and the tax power basis
for such taxation is the belief that the interstate commerce and interstate business
must bear its fair share of the cost of the production and benefits it receives from
the local areas. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 49 (1940); 4
ARx. L. BEv. 473, 474 (1950).
In opposition to such arguments put forth by states and cities is the Con-
stitutional protection agaist erection of trade barriers guaranteed by the Com-
merce Clause. Certainly the Clause definitely rules out the contended need to
protect local merchants from outside competition, and it can be stated generally
that the taxation or regulation by the local governments will be upheld only where
it is not discriminatory against interstate commerce, or where it does not unduly
burden or prohibit the free flow on interstate commerce. Cordell v. Common-
wealth, 254 S.W. 2d 484, 485 (Ky. 1953).
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The reason most often given for permitting states and cities to tax
and regulate peddlers is that the taxes apply to the peddlers occupa-
tion and to his goods after they have completed their interstate com-
merce. In Emert v. Missouri,4 a leading peddler case, a Missouri re-
quirement for a peddlers license was upheld against defendant Emert,
an itinerant employee of Singer Sewing Machine Company, who sold
one machine off his wagon while soliciting orders for sale of others
which would be shipped from out-of-state.
The only business or commerce in which he was engaged was internal
and domestic; and, so far as appears, the only goods in which he was
dealing had become part of the mass of property within the State.
Both the occupation and the goods, therefore, were subject to the
taxing power, and to the police power, of the State. 5
It is argued that since the peddler and his goods are already in the
state, the state's regulation and taxation of him and his goods will not
burden interstate commerce. Of course, it must be noted that regula-
tion and taxation discriminating against commerce is not constitutional,
even as against peddlers.
6
Solicitors, on the other hand, have been held to be immune to
state and municipal taxation and regulation. It is said that the solicita-
tion of orders for goods to be shipped into a State from another State
or foreign country is a definite and integral part of interstate com-
merce. To permit local interference with drummers, it is feared,
would result in a burden on interstate commerce even before it has
begun. The leading case on state taxation and regulation of interstate
commerce solicitors is Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,7
wherein it was held that the "negotiation of sales of goods which are
in another state, for the purpose of introducing them into the state in
which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce." s A tax of $10
per week or $25 per month on defendant solicitor in Tennessee for a
Cincinnati stationery firm was ruled unconstitutional, the court saying
that such restrictions affect the very foundations of interstate trade.9
Such taxation could lead to prohibition of interstate commerce, the
court added.
'156 U.S. 296 (1895).
Id. at 311.
'Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 393 (1952);
Hi RAu,, supra note 2 at 109; Ro-rscmrAFFR, A raucAN CONsTTroNAL. LAW
357 (1939); 40 Am. Jim. 928 (1942), "Obviously, a statute or ordinance which
places on interstate commerce by reason of its very interstate nature a burden the
like of which is not placed on intrastate commerce is a regulation of interstate com-
merce and is therefore unconstitutional."
7 120 U.S. 489 (1887); HAERnmAN, supra note 2 at 108; 52 HAnv. L. REV. 617,
618 (1939). But see 60 AiMa. L. REv. 641, 644 (1926).
8120 U.S. 489, 497.
9 id. at 494.
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McCall v. California1 ° also ruled unconstitutional a $25 per quarter
license fee imposed upon a solicitor for cross-country railroad pas-
senger traffic. Stating that the object and effect of his solicitation
agency were to increase the volume of business on the railroad he
represented, the Court used this relationship as a test-"Was this busi-
ness a part of the commerce of the road?"-to conclude that the power
to tax the business involved the 'lessening of commerce to an extent
commensurate with the amount of business done by the agent." 1'
In McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co.,1 2 a 1940 case, a New York
City sales tax was upheld, the Court saying that the tax was laid upon
every purchaser of goods for consumption, regardless of whether they
had been transported in interstate commerce. Furthermore, the tax
applied only if a sale was made. The Supreme Court observed that
the Robbins v. Shelby County rule had been narrowly limited to fixed-
sum license taxes imposed on the business of soliciting orders for the
purchase of goods to be shipped interstate. The court said that the
statute in the Robbins case could and in fact did operate to some extent
to place the merchant thus doing business interstate at a disadvantage
in competition with untaxed sales at retail stores within the state.1
3
A tax to be paid in advance and which "bears no relation to actual
or probable sales" was held invalid in another solicitor case, Best & Co.,
Inc. v. Maxwell,14 in 1940. That was a privilege tax on persons or
corporations, not regular North Carolina retail merchants, renting hotel
rooms, etc., to display samples from which local customers could
select for orders from the out-of-state seller. Such a tax, the Court
said, could operate only to "discourage and hinder the appearance of
interstate commerce in the North Carolina retail market."15
Speculation that McGoldrick and subsequent cases had over-ruled
the drummer cases was put to rest by Nippert v. City of Richmond,16
where the court took a more sensible approach than "local incident"
in striking down the city's license tax on solicitors. The substantial
effects, actual or potential, of a particular tax in suppressing or unduly
burdening commerce are determinative as to whether or not a "local
incident" may be made the subject of state taxation, the court said.
Here was a tax which was applied to all solicitors, whether local or
itinerant, and it was held that such a tax in its practical operation
worked discriminately against interstate commerce to impose upon it
0 136 U.S. 104 (1890).
"Id. at 109, ii.
-309 U.S. 83 (1940).
"Id. at 56.
"311 U.S. 454 (1940); 18 N. Ca. L. Rxv. 48 (1939).
311 U.S. 454, 457.
16327 U.S. 416 (1946); 1952 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1.
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a burden "either in fact or by the very threat of its incidence, which
[it] did not place upon competing local businesses."17 The court cited
the McGoldrick case, emphasizing that the New York tax did not
create such a discriminatory burden. Furthermore, in New York the
"economic incidence of the tax fell only upon the completed trans-
action, not as in this case on the very initial step toward bringing one
about."' 8 The court felt that the privilege tax would hit especially hard
at the solicitors whose product was of a highly limited or special char-
acter and whose market in any single locality for that reason or others
"cannot be mined more than once in every so often."
The potential excluding effects . . . are magnified many times by
recalling that the tax is a municipal tax. . . . But the cumulative
effect, practically speaking, of flat municipal taxes laid in succession
upon the itinerant merchant as he passes from town to town is
obviously greater than that of any tax of statewide application likely
to be laid by the legislature itself . . . The drummer or salesman
whose business requires him to move from place to place, exhausting
his market at each periodic visit or conducting his business in more
sporadic fashion with reference to particular localities, would find
the cumulative burden of the Richmond type of tax eating away all
possible return from his selling.' 9
The idea that solicitation is a "local activity" over which a state or
municipality has a taxing or regulatory power also was destroyed in
Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone,20 a 1951 case which more nearly
presents the problem arising from the penumbra cast between the
solicitors and peddlers. The Supreme Court, even with a liberal read-
ing of the Mississippi Court's opinion2' that pick-up and delivery of
laundry and dry cleaning was included in the statutory term soliciting,
nevertheless ruled the taxing statute invalid. If it was read as a regu-
lation on soliciting as defined by the federal Supreme Court, then it
was invalid under the drummer decisions. If read so that the statutory
term required acts beyond the ordinary meaning of soliciting, the
Court used test of discrimination to invalidate the law in its applica-
tion to the Tennessee laundry. As has been pointed out above, ped-
dlers' taxes or regulations are not valid if they discriminate against the
interstate peddler as such. It would seem that the Court may have
3 27 U.S. 416, 425 (1946). "All interstate commerce takes place within the
confines of the states and necessarily involves "incidents' occurring within each state
through which it passes or with which it is connected in fact. And there is no
known limit to the human mind's capacity to carve out from what is an entire and
integrated economic process particular phases or incidents, label them as 'separate
and distinct' or 'local, and thus achieve its desired result." (At p. 423).
1Id. at 427.
"Id. at 429. See also 52 HA v. L. REv. 617, 621 (1939).
"342 U.S. 389 (1952); 26 So. CAL. L. REv. 196 (1953).
'Stone v. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, 53 So. 2d 89 (1951).
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considered the delivery and pick-up aspects of the laundry's businesb
as falling into the peddlers fringe area.
The "peddler" cases are inapposite under such a showing of dis-
crimination since they support state taxation only where no dis-
crimination against interstate commerce appears either upon the face
of the tax laws or in their practical operation.
22
The interstate photography business presents an excellent situation
for an analysis of the law applicable to municipal occupational privi-
lege taxes. The most common transaction in interstate commerce is
begun by a solicitor who travels from city to city among the residential
neighborhoods obtaining orders for photographic sittings and sub-
sequent purchases. He usually collects a small fee from the customer
in return for a coupon, which is to be presented to the photographer,
who usually follows the solicitor into the community about a week
later. The photographer takes the photo of the customer, sometimes
in a rented hotel room, sometimes at the purchaser's home, and he
collects a similar small fee at that time. Then the negative is sent to
the out-of-state office where it is developed. A photograph is then
sent to a third agent who delivers it to the purchaser and seeks orders
for more prints.
Several photographer decisions have produced a seeming conflict
in the courts' handling of these in-between situations. No such cases
have gone to the United States Supreme Court, but in 1936, in Lucas v.
City of Charlotte,23 the Fourth Circuit Court dealt with the typical
interstate photography transaction. The city had imposed a $25 fee
for transient photographers and the agent, representing a St. Paul,
Minnesota firm, contended the fee to be a burden upon and an inter-
ference with interstate commerce. The Court ruled the tax valid,
believing the transaction not to be an interstate one. The Court dis-
counted the effects of the out-of-state development of the negatives,
contending that the photographer was carrying on his business in the
City of Charlotte. It should be emphasized that this decision came
ten years before the Nippert opinion attacked the 'local incident"
contentions of taxing governments.
However, as late as 1948, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Craig
v. Mills,24 again dealing with the ordinary interstate photography
transaction, also ruled in favor of the taxing body. "Local activity"
' 342 U.S. 389, 395, supra note 20. Other "drummer" cases and sources are:
Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925); Wagner v. City
of Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919); Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913);
Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 (1903); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S.
289 (1894); RorscnAEFr n, supra note 6 at 318; 40 Am. Jun. 929 (1942).
= 86 F. 2d 394 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1936).
'203 Miss. 692, 33 So. 2d 801 (1948).
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was the Court's heavy weapon in holding the privilege tax valid, and
the opinion cushioned with the warning that resident photographers
would likewise be liable for the same tax if they would take their
photos instate and develop them elsewhere.
From its very nature the business of taking photographs is essentially
localized in character . . . [The tax] is levied upon the local activity
of taking photographs in this state which are to be thereafter de-
veloped outside of the state. The interstate commerce does not begin
until after the work of the photographer in taking the negative is
completed. The taking of such a negative is not commerce, but is
merely a step in the preparation therefore and which is taken by one
engaged in a particular calling or profession in this state.
2 5
The Mississippi Court relied upon the Lucas case and also upon Stone
v. Memphis Natural Gas Co., 26 but distinguished the Nippert case as
one not concerning a tax upon a "local activity in the taxing state
which constitutes the original, basic and essential step in the manu-
facturing of the article to be sold."27 It would seem, then, that the
Mississippi Court would first decide whether or not the instate activity
was substantial, whereas the Nippert reasoning would question the
effects of the tax upon the overall interstate commerce.
Although the Lucas and Craig cases held the occupational privilege
tax on photographers valid, several other decisions in state courts have
found the laws unconstitutional. Cordell v. Commonwealth,28 a 1953
Kentucky case, struck down a Prestonsburg ordinance imposing a
license tax of $10 a day or $200 a year upon all persons, other than
those having an established business within the city who engaged
temporarily in the sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, including
photographs. The Court stated that "the mere presence of some local
incidents is not sufficient to sustain the tax."2 9 It would seem that the
Id. 33 So. 2d at 807.
29 So. 2d 268 (Miss. 1947), where a state corporate franchise tax upon
defendant was upheld. The Gas Company had a pipe line running from Louisiana
to Memphis, Tennessee, 185 miles through Mississippi, with two compressing sta-
tions within Mississippi. Although the Gas Company was engaged solely in inter-
state business, the court felt that the active maintenance, supervision and repair
of the pipe line was of substantial character and was protected by the State, so
that it could be detached from interstate commerce in order to impose the state
tax. The court emphasized that the franchise tax was only $8400 per annum
whereas the ad valorem taxes were $82,000 a year. Perhaps the tax would be
found valid even with the test of substantial effect on the overall interstate com-
merce in a similar case.
' Supra note 24, 38 So. 2d at 808. See also Graves v. State, 258 Ala. 859,
62 So. 2d 446 (1958), commented upon in 29 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 291 (1954).
' Supra note 3. See also Olan Mills v. Elizabethtown, 269 S.W. 2d 201 (Ky.
1954), where a similar tax, even though imposed upon local as well as itinerant




Kentucky court was partly looking to the "substantial effects" test as it
stated that the cumulative effect of such a tax might conceivably
destroy the right to engage in such an interstate business, and would
definitely lay an undue burden on the business involved. It should be
stressed, however, that the ordinance's application to appellants was
also ruled invalid on the ground that the ordinance by its express
terms discriminated against itinerant photographers.
Vantine v. City of Portsmouth0 is a similar case, decided by the
New Hampshire court in 1948, in which the tax was $5 a day, $25 a
week, or $100 a month, with no license required of Portsmouth photog-
raphers, and with no substantially equivalent charges being required
of them. The court struck down the imposition of the tax as being
discriminatory against non-resident photographers, but it also pointed
out that the tax imposed a possible cumulative burden which con-
stituted a barrier to interstate commerce.31
Gainesville, Georgia imposed a $10 daily fee upon itinerant photog-
raphers with local competitors paying only $15 a year.32 The city con-
tended that the ordinance was enacted as a police regulation for the
protection of the citizens of Gainesville against probable fraudulent
conduct of itinerant tradesmen, and that as such, it was a proper and
valid use of the police power of the city. The court ruled that the
business activities under consideration amounted to interstate com-
merce and that the ordinance was invalid in its application thereto
because of its discriminatory character and its undue burden on inter-
state commerce. The court cited the Nippert case in saying that the
taking of the photographs, though such might be classified as a sep-
arate and distinct incident, local in nature, nevertheless could not be
hampered by regulations.
A fixed-sum ($2000) bonding requirement was held unconstitu-
tional in a 1951 North Carolina photography decision, State v.
Mobley,33 where the court relied upon both discrimination and undue
burden to rule the statute invalid. The court held that the bonding
requirement (separate bond required for each county in which work
planned) reached beyond the justifiable purpose of the statute, ex-
pressed therein to be the prevention of the perpetration of certain
fraudulent practices by photographers within North Carolina. The
fixed-sum requirement failed to provide flexibility, it was said, in
reasonable relation to the volume of sales, and was therefore in-
- 95 N.H. 171, 59 A. 2d 475 (1948).
'lid. 59 A. 2d at 476. "While interstate commerce may be required to pay
its way, it must be placed on a plane of equality with local trade and com-
merce.
Graves v. City of Gainesville, 78 Ga. App. 186, 51 S.E. 2d 58 (1948).
Supra note 2.
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herently discriminatory and unduly burdensome on interstate com-
merce.
A similar bonding requirement in Florida was also ruled uncon-
stitutional,3 4 as the court considered each of the operations of the
extrastate photography firm to constitute "an inseparable link in a
chain of events which should be considered as a whole"35 and as such
as interstate commerce. The tax was considered to be palpably dis-
criminatory, if in fact not prohibitive, and also unduly burdensome to
interstate commerce.
An excellent case for summing up the discussion on photographers
is Nicholson v. Forrest City.36 The ordinance in that Arkansas city
required only an $11 per year fee. The photographer, the solicitor,
and the proof passer all were convicted and fined $10 and costs in
police court for violation of the ordinance. The tax on the solicitor
and on the proof passer (also a solicitor) was easily written off by
reliance on the Nippert case, the court writing:
.. . the Richmond tax, superficially the same on all solicitations
whether for interstate or intrastate sales, in average practice imposed
much the heavier burden on sales for extrastate sellers. "So far as ap-
pears a single act of unlicensed solicitation would bring the sanction
into play. The tax thus inherently bore no relation to the volume of
business done or of returns from it" . . . If such a tax might be levied
by one town, it might be levied by ten towns, or twenty, or all the
towns in a state, or all the towns in all the states to which a seller's
commerce might extend .. . "Not the tax in a vacuum of words, but
its practical consequences for the doing of interstate commerce in
applications to concrete facts are our concern."37
But the city tried to distinguish the imposition on the photographer,
insisting that he "engages in a series of tangible physical local acts,
acts subject to local police regulation, acts that do not necessarily in
their nature belong to the chain of interstate commerce." 38 The court
agreed with such insistence, but said that such was equally true of the
acts of the salesman. Both are commerce, they decided, with the
decision as to whether or not the local interference was proper de-
pending "not so much upon what element in the commerce is taxed
as upon how the tax effects the whole of commerce."39 They would
accept the city's contention as to the photographer only if the privilege
tax on the cameraman would have less detrimental effect than would
a similar tax on the solicitor, and this they doubted. "The cameraman's
Olan Mills, Inc. of Alabama v. City of Tallahassee, 43 So. 2d 521 (Fla.
1949).
Id. at 524.
216 Ark. 808, 228 S.W. 2d 53 (1950); 4 Aux. L. REv . 473 (1950).
Id. 228 S.W. 2d at 55.
8 Id. at 56.
Ibid.
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activity is the central feature, the key occurrence, in the interstate
transaction which the contract between the customer and Olan Mills,
Inc. calls for."40 Both taxes enable a local photography business to
operate more cheaply than an interstate business, as far as taxes are
concerned, they said. And the comparatively lesser fee did not aid
the Forrest City tax. "The evil of such taxes lies not so much in their
amount as in their discriminatory character." 41 The Court suggested
that such occupations could be successfully taxed only where the
tax, in its practical effect, would not substantially discriminate in
favor of comparable activities in intrastate commerce which compete
economically with the interstate activities that are taxed.
It is believed that the rule set out in the Forrest City case, and by
the Kentucky, New Hampshire, Florida, and Georgia courts, is the
rule which would be written by the United States Supreme Court on
the validity of occupational privilege taxes upon photographers. The
tax on peddlers is permitted because it is imposed after interstate com-
merce has ended. Also, the ,activity of peddling keeps the itinerant
businessman longer in one area than does soliciting. The peddling
activity is purely local, and the peddler's goods are a part of the local
mass of property. All of these considerations, plus the above expressed
needs for local, regulation and taxation, contribute to justify the ac-
cepted right of municipalities to tax and to regulate the privilege of
peddling. Contrariwise, different considerations overcome the con-
tended need for local taxation and regulation of solicitors. It is
thought that the same considerations also apply to protect the photog-
rapher from local interference. The solicitor is the primary link of the
interstate business chain. Out-state manufacturers and merchants want
to know about the market before sending goods to it at great expense.
It is the solicitor's duty to obtain that market, to make it profitable for
the merchant or manufacturer to send his products interstate. To tax
this beginning, to burden it in any way, or to discriminate against it
can be destructive of interstate commerce. McCall v. California
illustrates aptly that the Court will look to the practical effect of local
interference upon interstate commerce. If there is any possible sub-
stantial effect on the free flow, local interference is ruled out. This
theory also rules out the contention that local incidents will furnish
reason for local taxation and regulation, discussed fully in the Nippert
case. The real test, then, for permitting or not permitting municipal
,0 Ibid.
I Id. at 57. See also State v. Ballance, 51 S.E. 2d 731 (N. Car. 1949), and
comment 24 No=E DAmE LAW. 583 (1949); HA AIJ, supra note 2 at 112.
2 Supra note 11. See also 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 where the "substantial
effects" test of the Nippert case is discussed.
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legislation to remain applicable to interstate traders, is whether or not
there might be a commensurate lessening of interstate trade-whether
or not interstate commerce is put at a disadvantage in fact. And this
test can be applied appropriately to those penumbra situations falling
between solicitors and peddlers, especially photographers, noted here-
in. It is believed that municipal occupational license fees on photog-
raphers, even if they do not discriminate expressly against itinerants,
do operate to cut down on the volume of the interstate photography.
commerce. 43 The cumulative effect is just as bad for the photogra-
pher as it is for his pre-touring solicitor. If the tax is permitted to be
levied against the cameraman so that he is effectively barred from fol-
lowing the protected solicitor, then what practical gain in the protec-
tion of interstate commerce can be achieved by immunizing the so-
licitor? As pointed out in the Forrest City decision, the taking of the
picture is the central feature of this particular interstate business, and
without the photographer and his camera there can not even be a
product for interstate commerce to handle. It is therefore submitted
that municipal occupational taxes upon such photographers are un-
constitutional, being violative of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.44
CHARLEs RicaRD DoYLE
See RorrsCaA-FFMr, supra note 6 at 346; "A business consisting wholly in
the performance of services that are an indispensable part thereof is equally im-
mune to such taxation."
"The municipalities do have some recourse against such "nuisances." See,
for example, Breard v. Alexandria, supra note 2 at 637: "... a permissible burden
on commerce." [To require prior consent of owners of residences to be solicited]
at 638: ". . . but regulation that leaves out-of-state sellers on the same basis as
local sellers cannot be invalid for that reason." 50 MicH. L. REv. 150 (1951); 35
MARQ. L. REv. 198 (1951); 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 233, 257, 262, suggesting Con-
gressional legislation; 5 FLA. L. REv. 196 (1952).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-
WHAT ARE "PRINCIPAL CONTRACTORS"?
A confusing area in the law of workmen's compensation has de-
veloped in connection with the term "principal contractor." The term
appears in provisions of workmen's compensation acts designed at
making a "principal contractor" the statutory employer of the employee
of his subcontractors.1 Mr. Schneider, in his Workmen's Compensa-
tion Text states that:
I See 2 ScmmNEE, WoRmxE's COMPENSATION TEXT 176 (1942) (where he
states that all but seven states have statutes which constitute the principal con-
tractor the statutory employer of the employees of the subcontractor, although in
fact he may not be the actual employer of the injured employee); 71 C.J. 483
(1935); 58 Ai. JuR. 672 (1948).
